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Abstract—This paper analyzes how social structure and
social reinforcement affect the diffusion of an idea in
a population of human agents. A percolation approach
is used to model the diffusion process. This framework
assumes that information is local and embedded in a social
network. We introduce social reinforcement in the model
by softening the condition to adopt when the number of
adopting neighbors increases. Our numerical analysis shows
that social reinforcement severely affects the output of the
process. Some ideas with an original value so low that it
would never get diffused can be spread due to the strength
of social reinforcement. This effect also interacts with the
structure of the network, with a more sizeable impact on
small worlds with a low rewiring probability. Also, social
reinforcement completely changes the effect of clustering
links, because sequential adoption of neighbors can make
one agent adopt at later stages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The success or failure of an idea depends not only on
the goodness of the idea but also on the diffusion process.
There are many examples in history of ideas that were
dismissed at first and much later proven right. As many
ideas spread through social contact, the social structure
of individuals is likely to be determinant in the diffusion
process. The present paper performs a theoretical study
of the influence of social reinforcement on the diffusion
of ideas in a population of human agents.
There is an ongoing debate in recent literature as to
which social network structure is optimal in terms of
diffusion [1]. The first strand of literature builds upon [2]
“weak ties hypothesis”. According to this idea, long ties
between otherwise unconnected neighborhoods facilitate
the spread of information, as they reduce the redundancy
of the diffusion process [3].
The second strand of literature builds on the work by
[4] and argues that close social structures promote trust,
and thus facilitates information sharing and transmission.
Thus, networks with overlapping neighborhoods (highly
clustered networks) are better suited to promote diffusion
[5].
The empirical evidence to support both theories is wide
and strong. In recent works, Damon Centola has argued
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that none of them can be generalized to “whatever is
diffused”, but depends on whether the process is a simple
or a complex contagion process [6], [7], [8], [9]. In simple
contagions, only the first contact with an infected agent
determines whether or not an agent is infected. In such a
case, information in closed neighborhoods is redundant,
and long ties can bridge distant neighborhoods and allow
for information to travel through the network. In complex
contagions, on the other hand, transmission depends on
interactions with multiple infected agents. Thus, clustered
neighborhoods are not redundant anymore, but provide
with multiple sources of reinforcement that can promote
transmission. Accordingly, they finds that complex con-
tagion processes diffuse better in clustered networks like
small-worlds [10] or lattices than in random networks
[11].
In this paper we will argue that it is not only the
nature of the diffusion process but the distribution of
“incredulity” or resistance to contagion of agents, that de-
termines the performance of different network structures.
In order to do so, we build upon a percolation framework
to study the interplay of individual preferences and social
reinforcement, in order to have a theoretical benchmark
that can help understanding the role of structural factors
such as clustering in diffusion processes. We consider that
ideas are diffused by word-of-mouth [12] by friends in
a complex way. We find that for uniform distributions
of incredulity, the strength of weak ties hypothesis can
still apply for complex contagion processes. On the
other hand, for incredulous populations the reinforcement
mechanism is more important and clustered networks do
better than random ones.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
introduces the basic model and the extension with social
reinforcement. In Section III we introduce a different
distribution of agents. Finally, in Section IV we present
some conclusions.
II. BASIC PERCOLATION MODEL AND SOCIAL
REINFORCEMENT EXTENSION
A. Basic percolation
In this article we study the diffusion process of new
ideas on a population that presents a social network struc-
ture. Ideas are identified by their value, represented by a
number v ∈ [0, 1]. Agents are heterogeneous and they are
characterized by a minimum quality requirement (MQR)
for adopting a new idea. The higher the MQR -the more
“incredulous” an agent is- the higher the value he requires
of an idea in order to adopt it. The MQR of agents
is a random variable which is uniformly distributed,
q ∼ U [0, 1]. This modelling framework corresponds to
the so-called percolation model [13].
In a percolation model of diffusion one agent adopts
the new idea at any given time t (time is discrete) if the
following three conditions are met:
• the agent has not adopted before t,
• the agent is informed, which only occurs if at least
one neighbor has adopted at time t− 1,
• the value of the idea is higher than the MQR of the
agent, that is q < v.
Without a social structure the percolation model behaves
as a well-mixed population of consumers. In a well-mixed
population, agents are not embedded in a social network
and they have perfect information. As soon as the idea
enters the “market”, the willing to adopt agents adopt it
while the rest don’t. As the MQR is uniformly distributed
q ∼ U [0, 1], a proportion 100 × v0% of the population
will adopt an idea of value v0 ∈ [0, 1]. This case can
be represented in our model with a complete network,
where every agent is connected to every other agent. In
a complete network, a single early adopter will inform
the whole population of agents about the existence of the
idea.
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B. Network structure
In a percolation setting, agents become informed of
the existence of the idea through her neighbors. Thus,
the structure of the social network where the agents are
embedded can be determinant of the outcome of the
process [6]. Previous studies have considered percolation
processes in regular networks as a two dimensional lattice
[14], [15], [16] or a completely random network [12] .
These networks do not offer an accurate description of
a social network [17], although their simplicity can be
useful for their implementation and the interpretation of
the results.
In this paper we propose the use of the small world
algorithm [10] for the modelling of the social structure
as in [18]. This provides with a family of networks,
an interpolation between regular lattices and completely
random networks. The algorithm starts with a regular
ring lattice and rewires every link with probability µ.
This parameter allows to fine tune the randomness of the
network.
The small world algorithm produces a network struc-
ture that reproduces two well-known properties of social
networks. On the one hand, they have a high clustering
coefficient. That is to say, that the probability of two
nodes to be connected together is higher if they share a
mutual neighbor. This is a typical characteristic of social
networks, where friendship groups are tight communities,
and friends share many connections. On the other hand,
small worlds have a low average path length. This is the
so-called “six degrees of separation” theory introduced
by [19], according to which every person in the world is
separated from every other person by a very small number
of connections such as friendship.
Varying the rewiring probability µ of the small world
algorithm produces networks with varying average path
length and clustering coefficient (Figure 1). The case
Fig. 1: Clustering coefficient C(p) and average path-
length L(p) as a function of the rewiring probability in
small world networks [10].
with µ = 0 is the one-dimensional regular lattice, and
the case with µ = 1 is the random network, also
known as Poisson network or Erdos-Renyi model. The
“typical” Small World is the one with rewiring probability
µ = 0.01, presenting an average path-length almost as
low as the Poisson network, while still having a clustering
coefficient which is comparable with the one-dimensional
regular lattice.
C. Social reinforcement
The difference between the basic percolation model
and the social reinforcement extension lies in how the
MQR of agents is calculated. Let qt be the MQR of
an agent at time t. In the basic percolation model this
threshold remains constant over time, with qt = q0 ∀t.
Thus, the number of adopting neighbors does not play
any role in adoption decisions. Nothing changes for an
agent if she knows about the new idea from one or many
neighbors: the number of adopting neighbors does not
have any weight, and additional adoptions are only redun-
dant information. We extend this model by introducing a
local social reinforcement effect. We include a new factor
in the expression of the value of an idea, according to
which decisions are influenced by the number of adopting
neighbors. Adopting neighbors can “advocate” in favor of
the idea, so as to increase the likelihood of its adoption.
The updated MQR is defined to satisfy the following
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hypothesis of the model. Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the MQR of
an agent, a ∈ N the number of adopting neighbors and
γ ∈ [0, 1] a parameter expressing the social reinforcement
intensity. The functional form f(q, a, γ) is chosen such
that:
1) it is decreasing in the absolute number of adopting
neighbors, ∂f∂a < 0;
2) it is decreasing in social reinforcement, ∂f∂γ < 0;
3) with only one neighbor adopting it is equal to the
initial MQR q0;
4) without social reinforcement (γ = 0) it is equal to
the basic percolation model.
The first condition implies that neighbors give positive
information about the idea: the more neighbors adopt, the
easier it is for an agent to adopt. The second condition
means that social reinforcement is a positive force for
adoption. With the same number of adopting neighbors,
the updated value of MQR will be lower for higher
social reinforcement intensities, so adoption will be easier.
The first decision to adopt for an agent is after the first
adoption in her neighborhood. In order to compare our
results with the benchmark percolation case, we need the
MQR of agents to be their initial value with only one
neighbor adopting (third condition). Finally, the fourth
condition allows us to keep the benchmark percolation as
a particular case of the extended model. The functional
form in Equation (1) fulfills all four conditions.
qit = q
i
0 ·
( 1
# neighbors of i that have adopted
)γ
= qi0 ·
( 1
ait
)γ
(1)
D. Simulation results
In this section we study the percolation model extended
with social reinforcement by mean of batch simulation
experiments. For the social network structure, different
instances of the small world model [10] are considered,
which are identified by a rewiring probability µ ∈
{0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1}. We consider N = 10, 000 nodes
representing potential adopters, with k = 4 neighbors on
average. We simulate the model in different settings rep-
resented by the rewiring probability µ (network structure),
the idea initial value v0, and the social reinforcement
intensity γ. The MQRs of agents are random draws from
a uniform distribution, q ∼ U [0, 1]. For each setting we
run R = 50 simulations, and look at the average value
of the diffusion size together with its standard deviation
across the different runs. In all simulations the diffusion
process is initialized with 10 early adopters, the seeds of
the simulation.
Results of the simulations are reported in Figure 2.
Without social reinforcement (γ = 0), the social structure
creates “information failures” compared to the well-mixed
population with perfect information. Some willing to
adopt agents never become informed of the existence of
the idea because none of their neighbors have adopted
it. Thus, the final diffusion size is lower than the linear
demand (dashed line).
We first observe that in the diffusion regime of per-
colation (above the threshold represented by the sharp
increase in diffusion size), the social reinforcement factor
adds to the diffusion levels of the basic percolation model.
Moreover, the number of adopters can even surpass the
linear diffusion level of a well-mixed population. This is
because with social reinforcement agents get to have a
subjective valuation of the idea which is above its initial
value v0, and possibly above their minimum required
quality even if the initial value was below it.
A second but possibly more important change is for
the position of the percolation threshold. For the Poisson
network (µ = 1), an increasing social reinforcement in-
tensity does very little, since the position of the threshold
is almost unaffected across the different panels in Figure
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Fig. 2: Diffusion size in different small world networks for different initial values v0 ∈ [0, 1] of the diffusing idea
(horizontal axis) in different conditions of social reinforcement intensity γ ∈ [0, 1] (different panels). Reported values
are averages over 50 simulation runs. The network size is N = 10, 000 nodes, with 10 early adopters (seeds).
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2. The opposite is true for the regular one-dimensional
lattice and for Small World networks with µ = 0.001 and
µ = 0.01, that see their thresholds moving substantially
to lower values as γ increases. For instance, the typical
Small World network with µ = 0.01 has a threshold equal
to 0.2 without social reinforcement,1 which goes down to
about 0.7 with γ = 0.4 and to 0.6 with γ = 1.
The thresholds to percolation do not just decrease,
they also seem to change their nature. Without social
reinforcement (Figure 2) the threshold from non-diffusion
to diffusion regimes is a second order transition: there is
a sharp but continuous change in the number of adopters.
With social reinforcement (Figure 2), on the other hand,
the threshold looks more like a first order transition: the
number of adopters jumps from almost zero to almost
full diffusion. This can be the result of a critical mass
scenario. As soon as there is a sufficient number of
adopters, the social reinforcement forces the process to
cascade to complete diffusion. This effect only happens
in highly clustered networks (µ = 0.01 or lower). Without
social reinforcement clustering hampers diffusion, since
most links are redundant and cannot be used to reach
new sources of information. With social reinforcement,
though, another effect arises: shared friends may lead
an agent to adoption by increasing her subjective value
of an idea. Assume for instance that at a time t agent
i, Margaret, sees Bill, one of her neighbors, adopting
the idea. Still, the initial value of the idea is below
Margaret’s minimum required level, v0 < qir. At time t+1
another of her neighbors, Elinor, or agent j, adopts. This
happens exactly because their common friend Bill had
adopted the period before. Elinor had a lower minimum
requirement level than Margaret, which happens to be
such that vjr < vt+1 < v
i
r. Now, with two neighbors
adopting, the value of the idea for Margaret becomes
1The theoretical value is about 0.82, according to [20].
high enough as to be above her minimum requirement,
vt+2 > v
i
r. This is how the triadic structure of their
mutual friendship makes it possible for Margaret to adopt
at a later stage, which would have not happened in a
different social structure. Figure 3 shows an example of
this dynamic.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that increasing social reinforce-
ment intensity reduces the differences between network
structure. While without social reinforcement (γ = 0)
there are differences in the final size of diffusion for
v0 ∈ [0.3, 1] approximately, with a high social reinforce-
ment (γ = 1) this range is reduced to v0 ∈ [0.3, 0.5].
This result has important implications for policies aiming
at introducing some new behavior or idea: when agents
can be convinced by their friends, it is not so important
to know the social network structure. In a well-mixed
population, perfect information implies that every agent
instantly knows about any new idea. In a network setting,
this situation is represented by a fully connected network,
where every agent is neighbor of every other agent. In
this case, social reinforcement would lead to full diffusion
even for small values of the idea.2 Thus, it is important to
know that there is some kind of network structure in the
process. It is not so important, however, which structure
this is as long as it is not a perfect information setting.
III. NON-UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS
Most studies on complex propagation consider that
agents are homogeneous in their resistance to contagion
[6], [11]. In the previous section, we relax this assumption
by assuming a uniform distribution of MQRs. Nonethe-
2If an idea of value vo is introduced, a proportion vo of the N
agents would immediately adopt it, that is a total of N ·vo agents. In the
following step, the MQR of the remaining agents has been decreased by
1
Nvo
γ : at the end of the second step, vo(voN)γ agents have adopted.
The process continues so that after the s step, v1+sγo Nsγ agents have
adopted. If N > frac1vo, then lims(v
1+sγ
o N
sγ = inf , so the process
reaches full diffusion.
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(a) The white nodes represent the will-
ing to adopt neighbors.
(b) A willing to adopt agent adopts (red
node).
(c) The clustering links make social
reinforcement more intense for non-
willing to adopt agents.
Fig. 3: The effect of social reinforcement on clustered neighborhoods
less, the outcome of the diffusion process is highly
dependent on the specific distribution considered.
The marginal effect on the MQR of an having an
additional neighbor adopting is described in Equation
(??). The first adopting friends induce a large decrease
in the MQR, while after a large number of friends have
adopted the influence of an additional adopting neighbor
is negligible. Moreover, the effect on one more friend
adopting is larger for large values of qio. Thus, in this
section we will concentrate on a case where agent have
high initial MQRs.
qit = q
i
0(1/a
i
t)
γ → ∆qit
= qi0∆(a
i
t)
−γ
= qi0(−γ(ait)−gamma−1∆(ait)
= − q
i
0γ
(ait)
γ+1
∆ait (2)
As the effect of social reinforcement is higher upon
more reluctant or incredulous agents, we analyze here the
diffusion process in an incredulous population. Figure 4
shows the density of a Beta(α = 4, β = 1) distribution.
All values drawn from this distribution will be bounded to
[0, 1] as in the uniform distribution U [0, 1], although they
will be biased towards high values close to one. That way,
a distribution Beta(4, 1) represents a population where
most people are incredulous, or unwilling to adopt the
idea, and a few people are enthusiastic early adopters.
This is a realistic population that would provide an s-
shaped adoption curve over time [21].
A. Simulation results
As in the previous section, we use batch simulations
to compare the behavior of the diffusion process under
different conditions. We compare five network structures
from the samll world algorithm [10] with rewiring prob-
abilities µ ∈ {0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1}, N = 10, 000 nodes
and k = 4 initial neighbors. The MQRs of agents are
now drawn from a q ∼ Beta(4, 1) distribution. For every
setting of value of the idea vo ∈ [0, 1], social pressure
γ ∈ [0, 1] and rewiring probability µ we study the mean
diffusion size over R = 50 runs with 10 seeds or initial
adopters.
Results of the simulations are depicted in Figure 5.
Increasing the social reinforcement intensity γ increases
the number of adopters, as some of the unwilling to
adopt are convinced. It also decreases the percolation
thresholds, the minimum value of the idea vo that gets
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
(a) Density function (b) Cummulative distribution
Fig. 4: Probability distributions of a Beta(4, 1).
some diffusion. This effect is more accused for the more
regular networks, due to the reinforcement of clustering
links. In the random networks, however, the thresholds are
more stable. Thus, as the social reinforcement intensity γ
increases, the graphics for the different networks overlap
as in Figure 5, for γ = 0.4. If we continue to increase
γ, the clustered networks will overperform the random
Poisson network.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Introducing social reinforcement in a percolation model
of diffusion adds to the size of diffusion. In the case
of ideas that would otherwise not be diffused, social
reinforcement allows for some spreading in the popu-
lation. It also reduces the differences between network
structures. Without social reinforcement, clustering links
are redundant: if the number of ties is limited, they restrict
the access to new sources of information. Nonetheless,
when the opinion of neighbors can influence the adoption
process, clustering links can force agents to cascade to
adoption.
In simple propagations no social reinforcement is
present (γ = 0) and thus the size of diffusion is
determined by the number of willing to adopt agents
that the idea can reach. That is to say, the diffusion is
determined by the dimensionality of the network, how
many agents can be reached with every new step. As
random networks have the higher dimensionality, they
are the most efficient structures to spread an idea. In the
small world algorithm, clusters come at the expenses of
bridges: the more clustered the network is, the lower its
dimensionality as clustering links are redundant.
For complex propagations clustering links are not re-
dundant anymore. Indeed, they provide an additional sup-
port for the social reinforcement mechanism. Once a first
neighbor has adopted, the probability that a second neigh-
bor adopts increases with clustering coefficient. In the
limit case, a random network, the probabilities of different
neighbors adopting are independent. Thus, introducing
social reinforcement affects the diffusion in the random
network vaguely. It increases the number of adopters, as
some of the unwilling to adopt are convinced, but leaves
the percolation thresholds essentially unmoved. On the
other hand, the interaction of social reinforcement with
the structure of highly clustered networks alters both the
number of adopters and the thresholds of the shift from
a non-diffusion to a diffusion regime. Moreover, there
appears to be a change in the nature of these thresholds,
from a second order transition to a first order (discon-
tinuous) transition. The interplay of clustered networks
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Fig. 5: Diffusion size in different small world networks for different initial values v0 ∈ [0, 1] of the diffusing idea
(horizontal axis) in different conditions of social reinforcement intensity γ ∈ [0, 1] (different panels). Reported values
are averages over 50 simulation runs. The network size is N = 10, 000 nodes, with 10 early adopters (seeds). The
initial MQR values in the population follows a Beta(4, 1) distribution.
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decreasing their thresholds while random ones remain
more stable results in an homogenization of the results
for the different networks. For high intensities of social
reinforcement, it is important to know that there is a social
network underlying the process of diffusion, but not so
important to know which network it is. Nonetheless, even
with this uniformization of the network structures random
networks still come as the most efficient structures to
enhance diffusion.
In this setting, random networks get higher shares of
diffusion both for simple and complex propagations, con-
trary to the findings of [6], [9], [8]. Nonetheless, changing
the distribution of “incredulity” throughout the population
of agents can confirm their results. Our study confirms
that clustering can be favorable or harmful for diffusion,
depending on the setting. Nonetheless, the determinant of
which network structure is more efficient for spread is not
only the nature of the process (a complex or a simplex
propagation), but also the characteristics of the population
in which it diffuses.
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